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ECONOMICS MAKES STRANGE BEDFELLOWS:
PENSIONS, TRUSTS, AND HEDGE FUNDS IN AN
ERA OF FINANCIAL RE-INTERMEDIATION
J.W. Verret*
In Strong Managers, Weak Owners,' Professor Mark J. Roe articulates
an expansive theory to explain the evolution of the fragmented market
structure in the United States . He posits that political choices led to
fragmentation in the American financial markets, thus guiding the
evolution of the Berle-Means Corporation.3  His view is sometimes
supplemental to, but often in contradiction with, conventional economic
efficiency or functionalism arguments that are used to explain that
evolution.
This Article examines Professor Roe's theory. It will use the political
influences that Roe credits with fragmentation to understand current
changes in market structure, including the growth of hedge funds, in
general, as well as the advent of activist hedge funds that are re-shaping
corporate governance. It will end by exploring some unique problems
facing pensions and trusts that invest in hedge funds. The result will be a
deeper understanding of the Disintermediation Thesis within the model of
recent market evolution. This Article will also offer a policy prescription
for government regulators that oversee the fiduciary intermediaries who
invest in these new vehicles.
* I would like to thank Chief Justice Steele of the Delaware Supreme Court for his
helpful comments regarding this Article. I would also like to thank Mark Roe, Lucian
Bebchuk, Bob Pozen, Bob Steel, and Thomas Healey for influencing how I think about
corporate governance and financial regulation.
1. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE * 1994).
2. Id.
3. Id.
64 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:1
1. THE DISINTERMEDIATION OF CAPITAL IN THE UNITES STATES
A. Historical explanation
The traditional theory of capital market evolution is that firms initially
need to specialize and manage economic activity on vast scales, which
probably makes fragmentation a necessity . Firms need to perform
complex tasks, which are beyond the ability of shareholders to oversee.
But because managers suffer from an agency conflict,
5 it sometimes
becomes profitable for them to shirk their fiduciary duty toward
shareholders. While such temptations might be constrained by product
markets and access to financial markets, sometimes managers can get away
with fraud, shirking, or short-term empire building.
In attempting to monitor managers, shareholders suffer from a
collective action problem since it is not cost effective for any one
shareholder to undertake monitoring on his or her own.
6 Some governance
scholars argue that institutional intermediary owners can help eliminate this
collective action problem by aggregating share ownership This would
require, of course, that it become cost efficient for the intermediary to
monitor the firm's managers. A market that allows for intermediary
monitoring would be de-fragmented, which might allow for collegial and
hierarchical monitoring were it to become the norm. So why is that not a
feature of the American system?
The crux of this question is: Why are American corporations
organized so as to accumulate capital from individual investors with no
significant oversight or governance by intermediary financial groups such
as banks or pensions? Roe's answer is that political forces, rather than
economic ones, forced this evolution through legislation that makes
4. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (William S. Hein & Co. 1982) (1933) (discussing
why large corporations often have many managers making decisions regarding the
company).
5. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (discussing, in part, particular issues of agency conflict that
arise with the separation of decision-making and risk-bearing functions of corporate
managers).
6. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 453-63 (1991) (discussing the collective action
problem); see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520, 575-91 (1991) (outlining various shareholder incentives that might serve to overcome
the collective action problem).
7. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor
as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Black, supra note 6; Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional
Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991).
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intermediary involvement in corporate decision making both difficult and
expensive.'
The political process Roe describes is as follows: The source of laws
that restrict the power of intermediaries comes from both public opinion
and interest group power. Where the broad public has even a weak
preference, that preference cannot be outweighed by that of a smaller, more
interested group.9 The American public has always been suspicious of
consolidated economic power.'0 The flow of funds, though, is essential to
economic stability, thus a choice was inevitable: either intense regulation
of one consolidated entity, or fragmentation with light regulation." The
American government chose the latter. 2 These two forces are magnified
by federalism, which serves to enhance the effects of fragmentation and
path dependency, 3 which make institutions evolve in response to political
choices. Institutions that might have served as powerful intermediaries,
namely, mutual funds, pension funds, banks, and insurers, were all
constrained by a series of political reactions and rulemaking that
constrained their economic influence over firms through some version of
the political model described in Roe's thesis. 4 The political interest group
theory is that managers and labor join together to oppose the rise of
institutional investor power. Management does not want an intermediary
that can monitor its extraction of rents in the form of excessive
compensation, and labor is convinced that intermediaries will squeeze the
employment rolls to maximize investor returns.15
Roe's view that political influences effect financial dis-intermediation
serves as a supplement to the more universally accepted collective
action/economic explanation. But does it necessarily have to be this way?
In Germany, institutional investors control large blocks of stock. 16  In
Japan, financial institutions and companies engage in significant cross-
holding of stock through economic alliances (the keiretsu system). 7
8. Roe, supra note 1.
9. Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How
Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 89 (1986).
10. Roe, supra note 1, at 48.
11. Id. at41.
12. Id.
13. For a detailed explanation of path dependency, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J.
Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 127 (2000).
14. See, e.g., David Langer, Protector Becomes the Threat to Pensions, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, Sept. 14, 1992, at 15 (describing how United Steelworkers and the United
Auto Workers were key lobbyists for ERISA and especially the PGBC guarantees).
15. Roe, supra note 1, at 42-45.
16. See Hans-Jacob Kriimmel, German Universal Banking Scrutinized: Some Remarks
Concerning the Gessler Report, 4 J. BANKING & FIN. 33, 36-37 (1980).
17. See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu:
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The contrast between the American system and those of other
countries is largely due to different public perceptions about institutional
power and company hierarchy. Public mistrust of centralized power is not
as prevalent in Germany where labor power is actually retained by the
supervisory board of the firm."8 In addition, the German codetermination
culture and rules make the banks long-term partners with labor and other
potentially combative interest groups.19 In Japan, American influence over
rebuilding the banking system caused fragmentation, but cross-holding
developed, closely linking financial intermediaries with companies.
20
According to Roe, countries with a feudal past were and are more likely to
allow economic concentrations of power with heavy regulation.
Conversely, American public sentiment leaned against concentration.2 '
Because of this cultural prejudice, Americans prefer a more individualized,
small business financier over the Wall Street mogul.22 While Americans
also distrust large industrial moguls, they are more willing to side with
managerial arguments against financial intermediary power than with a
Wall Street banker. 23  The comparison of public sentiment between
countries is used by Roe to further the thesis that fragmentation is not the
only way to incentivize a shift of savings from households to firms; it is
merely the result of political choices informed by public sentiment and
24
interest group preferences.
America's pension system is an interesting example of Roe's theory in
action. Though corporate activism is not uncommon, it has tended to come
mostly from public pensions such as the California Public Employee
Retirement System ("CalPERS"). 25 Even though private pensions own a
large portion of publicly traded securities, they have tended to abstain from
corporate activism. 26 Indeed, private pensions rarely hold enough interest
Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871
(1993). Cf Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and
Comparative Corporate Governance, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 401 (2002) (arguing that the
Japanese system does not use a "main-bank" (or centralized) monitoring system).
18. Roe, supra note 1, at 169-221.
19. See Thomas Raiser, The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 111 (1988) (stating, among other things, that a German
concept of enterprise law entails linking and combining company law with labor law in
order to streamline the relationship between owners, employees, and managers).
20. Roe, supra note 1, at 169-22 1.
21. Roe, supra note 1, at 207, 221.
22. Roe, supra note 1, at 27-28.
23. Roe, supra note 1, at 208.
24. Roe, supra note 1.
25. Mark J. Roe, The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 75,
78 (1993).
26. Id. at 92 n.60 (citing H.B. Atwater, The Governance System Is Sound, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS, Spring 1991, at 17, 19 (stating, "I have never been asked about poison pills by a
private pension fund, but I am asked all the time by public pension funds.")).
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in a company to encourage management to even respond to their efforts to
27communicate.
One supposition is that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") encourages fragmentation.28 Passed in order to secure the
retirement pensions of the baby-boomer generation, ERISA has the effect
of limiting pension participation in corporate governance. This is because,
by placing corporate managers in charge of private pensions, 29 pension
managers are put in a position of conflict. Further, corporate managers
simply have no interest in taking on other managers.3 ° In effect, institutions
controlled by corporate managers are unlikely to control corporate
managers because they risk the same thing happening to them. This can be
combined with the fact that they get little advantage from being the first
player to change the rules of the game.3' This version of the golden rule
seems to be: "Do unto other companies as you would have their pension
funds do unto your company. 32
A second reason why ERISA has been so successful in limiting
private pension activism is that it encourages over-diversification and
discourages holding enough shares to make any meaningful change through
voting. In order to justify the cost of activism-paying for lawyers, court
costs, proxy campaigns, and time spent analyzing the target financials-a
fund needs to hold a large block of the target's stock. ERISA's prudent
investor rule discourages pensions from holding such portions of another
company's stock because of its insistence on maintaining the status quo of
other institutional investors who are similarly regulated out of activist
activity.33 In order to avoid lawsuits claiming they have breached their
fiduciary duty of trust, pension managers end up over-diversifying their
investments.34
Finally, securities laws prevent intermediaries from coordinating
corporate oversight without satisfying proxy notification rules, which the
intermediaries seek to avoid.35 This begs the question of how an increased
27. Private pension investment in corporate equities is roughly 9.6% of all publicly
traded equities, while public pensions hold slightly higher at 9.7%. FEDERAL RESERVE
FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS REPORT, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/current/zlr-
4.pdf (last visited October 17, 2007).
28. Roe, supra note 25, at 97.
29. Achieved through the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (2000).
30. Roe, supra note 25, at 84, 96.
31. See id. at 78.
32. WILLIAM M. O'BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH AND
POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING 200 (1992).
33. Roe, supra note 25, at 97-98.
34. See, e.g., Jones v. O'Higgins, No. 87-CV-1002, 1989 WL 103035, at *8 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 5, 1989) (finding that defendant corporation acted prudently in diversifying pension
assets to minimize the risk of loss).
35. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(a) (2000).
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number of intermediaries, especially hedge funds, fit into Roe's theory at
all. It seems that the power of national banks has found a way to overcome
the power of other interest groups. Perhaps labor is not as well organized
in an informational economy as it was in a manufacturing economy,
contributing to the downfall of that interest as a political force. Perhaps, as
well, farmers are no longer as concerned about banking power. Also,
stabilization of interest rates through sound Federal Reserve policymaking
might be one factor assuaging the national mood toward banks. Where
interest rates are generally low, customers might prefer the ability of large
enterprises to decrease fees through economies of scale more than they fear
the influence of consolidation. But it might also be that adding another
player to the game could change the dynamic completely.
B. Activist Hedge Funds and the New Economic Order
One might argue that intermediaries are beginning to exert more
influence. The Roe Thesis can deepen our understanding of the current
wave of activist hedge fund investing in the United States.36 Why is it that
political forces are willing to allow these intermediaries to hold such sway
over firms? Doesn't the same dynamic explained in Roe's political theory
still apply, with managers and labor banding together to oppose
intermediary power? But something is different now, because
demographics have shifted. CalPERS and the pensions of the AFL-CIO
are now political allies of the intermediaries, because they need the
efficiency that these intermediaries bring more than ever. These retirement
coffers are in a dramatic shortfall, and the political interest groups served
by this demographic are incredibly powerful. So, in light of this
demographic change, the nation's present lax attitude to de-fragmentation
is precisely in line with the Roe Thesis.
Further supporting the Roe Thesis is the fact that the hedge firms are
the intermediaries being chosen, rather than the other intermediaries being
de-regulated. In effect, path dependency has forced institutional investors
to become non-intermediary firms; they are built to accommodate the
regulation. Thus, they actually have to invest in other entities that are able
to actively oversee management. The intermediaries themselves invest in
intermediary funds; those intermediaries then get economic power, and the
interest groups do not protest because they need the returns more than they
fear the power of the intermediary.
36. Though not all hedge funds engage in activism-indeed, they are not even the most
popular hedge fund strategy-this Article will focus on hedge funds because they form the
vital link between institutional investors and publicly traded companies. This link could
potentially shatter the conventional wisdom about financial dis-intermediation.
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And are the interest groups involved static? Demographics change the
interests of the groups that affect regulation. The average age of a labor
force changes. The market makeup of heavy manufacturing versus service
sector or knowledge-based industry changes. Heavy manufacturing jobs
are more unionized; thus, union presence partially remedies the collective
action problem in heavily industrialized states, and the state would
rationally focus more on stakeholders because they have more political
power.
Unlike heavy industry's unionized labor force, knowledge-based
workers are likely more heavily compensated with stock options. Thus,
they will be more interested in shareholder wealth maximization and may
be less inclined to fight intermediary power. In addition, the employment
of service sector workers is often more fluid and more flexible in terms of
job transfers. This flexibility, however, weakens their ability to organize as
workers, creating a collective action problem. Thus, service sector
employees are not able to exercise as much control over management
through negotiation or through the political process as their unionized
counterparts.37
The rate at which households save also changes over time, which
either increases or decreases the economic power centered in the hands of
investment intermediaries. Efficiency gains that increase the ability of a
market to make outputs using fewer inputs would also necessarily alter the
dynamic between the interest groups in some unique way. All these
variables affect the way interest groups will respond to a market structure,
and will impact the outcomes informed by the Roe thesis. They also
deserve some examination and exploration to deepen our understanding of
this dynamic. But perhaps there is an even simpler explanation.
Demographics are always in the background of social change. In the
instance of hedge-fund intermediaries, the baby boom generation is
retiring. A great many pensions face severe funding shortfalls. 38 Hedge
funds promise to generate returns to remedy those funding shortfalls, thus
providing justification for pension investment. Therefore, the interest
group politics that classically constrained intermediation are conflicted;
some interest groups might still be suspicious of intermediary power, but
they cannot resist the added returns that activist hedge funds might offer.
37. However, their ability to access hedge funds, if they handle their own retirement
accounts, would be severely limited by the proposed minimum wealth requirement of $2.5
million. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles;
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 405
(proposed Jan. 4, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 275).
38. E.J. McMahon, Public Pension Price Tag, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2006, at A10,
available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/-wsj-public-pension-price-tag.htm.
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Activist hedge funds might also help to remedy the conflict that
corporate managers of private pensions face in overseeing fellow corporate
managers.39  With corporate governance activity one step removed,
corporate pension managers can wash their hands of the dirty work.
Indeed, with a bundle of dozens, or perhaps even hundreds, of corporate
pension investors, it would be difficult for the target corporation to contact
all of the pension managers that invest in the hedge fund to warn them
against continuing their investments with the fund.
As a secondary intermediary, activist hedge fund managers can bundle
the interests of small investments in order that the diversification problem
is not nearly as cogent for the pension investor. Indeed, the pension
investor will still be able to diversify his interests into different activist
hedge funds, while the activist fund amasses enough stake in one individual
company to make it cost effective for it to engage actively in overseeing the
company's affairs. Thus far, private pension exposure to hedge funds has
been limited to funds of funds,4° thereby putting a tertiary intermediary
between the corporate manager and the target, further eliminating the
diversification and conflict problems.
Roe posits that self-interested economics might make corporate
managers of private pensions engage in oversight if it was worth their
while. He notes, however, that the absence of other financial institutions to
lead the charge, due to dis-intermediation of mutual funds and banks,
means managers simply suffer from a collective action problem.4' Perhaps
activist hedge funds are the lead actor needed in order to make managers
39. Cf Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control 34-35 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No.
76/2006, 2006), available at http://ssrn.con/abstract-919881 (arguing that the slowdown in
private pension investments due to the resurgence of defined contribution plans, means that
pension investments are not expected to grow beyond their current level of 10% of hedge
fund investors). "The Hennessee Group recently estimated that public and private pension
funds combined account for 9% of the sources of capital to hedge funds." Id. at 35 n.200.
"In 1995, private pension funds held corporate equities of $1.3 trillion, amounting to 15% of
the total market value of corporate equities. By 2005, private pension funds held corporate
equities of $1.7 trillion, amounting to 9% of the total market value of corporate equities."
Id. n.201.
These figures, however, fail to account for 1) the percentage of total investors
comprised of pension funds in activist hedge funds; 2) increases in hedge fund investments
for those defined benefit plans that need to increase returns to meet demographic demands;
3) the likelihood of future congressional lawmaking to incentivize defined benefit plans
owing to expected strains on the retirement system; or 4) defined contribution plans
investing in funds of hedge funds. Pension fund links to activist hedge funds are significant,
and will only grow from here.
40. Id. n.202 ("Much of the new pension money enters the market through funds of
hedge funds." (quoting Jane B. Kenney et al., The Hedge Fund, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
June 2003, at 40)).
41. See Roe, supra note 25, at 95-96.
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interested. This is especially likely since the pensions and activist hedge
funds would be working together; the activist fund would be willing to do
all the work for fees as a percentage of the investment's performance.
Additionally, activist hedge funds can help alleviate any collective action
problems that public pensions face in instituting activist activity. 42  In
addition to its own corporate governance initiatives, CalPERS, for
example, also invests in activist hedge funds.43
Though banks, even after the Gramm Leach Bliley reforms, are still
constrained in their ability to act as financial intermediary overseers, the
trust money they invest on behalf of others can be placed in hedge funds
that can serve that function on their behalf. One reason for the rise of trust
money is development of the tax code that makes trusts more tax efficient.
Estate tax rates are in a severe state of temporal flux. Evolution in this area
is so uncertain that protection through trusts is now becoming more and
more popular.44 Another reason is, again, demographic shifts; as those
baby boomers that had saved near retirement begin to plan for the next
generation. And though trusts do not specifically fit into our dis-
intermediation story previously, it is apparent they are becoming a part of
it, and present the conflicts that will be most in need of oversight going
forward.
II. THE FEASIBILITY OF THE ACTIVIST HEDGE FUND AS A SERVICE
PROVIDER FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
Activist hedge funds are creatures of the 21st century of corporate
governance, only recently entering the scene to shake up the equilibrium
that had evolved in the 1990's. 45 Hedge fund activism can take the form of
42. Public pensions have always engaged in activism, but of a different sort. See Kahan
& Rock, supra note 39, at 15 (arguing that public pensions were involved in activism by
making shareholder proposals and engaging in private negotiations with the board of
directors). See also Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing
with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 866 (1993) (indicating that even
these limited actions can be meaningful and influence the corporate governance process
when "used simply, but credibly, as a threat").
43. This may in part help to remedy the political conflicts of interest that these investors
face. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 796-822 (1993). See also Kahan & Rock, supra
note 39, at 27 ("Given the potential pitfalls from high pay packages, a politically safer
course for pension fund boards that are willing to pay steep performance fees would be to
entrust funds to an outside entity rather than to pay such fees to in-house managers.").
44. Prudential, Estate Freeze Techniques in Times of Estate Tax Uncertainty:
Understanding How Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts and Intentionally Defective Grantor
Trusts Work and Why They Have Become So Popular, THE CUTTING EDGE, March 2005,
http://www.imakenews.com/absnewsletter/earticleOO0371468.cfm?x=b I 1,0,w.
45. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 1-2 ("Over the last few months, hedge funds
have pressured McDonalds to spin-off major assets in an IPO; asked Time-Warner to
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legal battles to inspect the corporate books46 as a prelude to further
litigation or as an aid in proxy fights, blocking takeovers,47 suits alleging
fiduciary duty violations in Delaware, or suits alleging securities fraud
liability under the PLSRA.4 8 It could also involve waging proxy contests
for corporate control or for board seats, or withholding vote campaigns to
oust directors using new majority voting by-laws.49  Until now, only a
minority of hedge funds have utilized the activist strategy. One estimate is
that roughly five percent of the one trillion dollar hedge fund world, or a
mere fifty billion dollars, is available for activism.50 However, this strategy
is still very new, and as returns in this space grow we can expect the
amount of capital diverted there to grow, as well.
The present value of benefits from the good public press in a proxy
fight will be quantifiably valuable to the hedge fund in a way that pensions
and trusts will not experience. 5 This dynamic speaks to active investment
management generally. People rarely make pension decisions based on
which pension manager recently made the front page of Business Week for
taking on the CEO of a company in a proxy fight or a withhold vote
campaign. The same cannot be said of institutional investments in hedge
funds. Thus, the activist hedge fund internalizes the positive externality of
the future reputation benefits of making a name for oneself as a strong
force in corporate activism.
If the overall cost of proxy fights declines, hedge funds will also
benefit to the extent their activism involves proxy wars. But even with
change its business strategy; threatened or commenced proxy contests over H.J. Heinz,
Massey Energy, KT&G, infoUSA, Sitel, and GenCorp; made a bid to acquire Houston
Exploration; pushed for a merger between Euronext and Deutsche Boerse; pushed for
changes in management and strategy at Nabi Biopharmaceuticals; opposed acquisitions by
Novartis of the remaining 58% stake in Chiron, by Sears Holdings of the 46% minority
interest in Sears Canada, by Micron of Lexar Media, and by a group of private equity firms
of VNU; threatened litigation against Delphi; and pushed for litigation against Calpine that
lead to the ouster of its top two executives." (citations omitted)).
46. See Stephen A. Radin, The New Stage of Corporate Governance Litigation: Section
220 Demands, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 1595 (2006) (exploring the development of Delaware
case law regarding demands to inspect and copy corporate records).
47. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 9.
48. See In re Tyson Foods, Inc., Sec. Litig., Civil Action No. 01-425-SLR, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17904 (D. Del. Oct. 6, 2003) (permitting a hedge fund to serve as lead plaintiff
in a securities fraud class action). However, appointing hedge funds as lead plaintiffs is not
without its complications. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 8 ("Because hedge funds
often engage in short selling, they face issues of reliance that may render them 'inadequate'
class representatives.").
49. For more on the use of majority vote campaigns by activist hedge funds, see J. W.
Verret, Pandora's Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie?: Majority Voting, Corporate Ballot
Access and the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-Examined 63 Bus. LAW. (forthcoming 2007).
50. Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 18 (citing J.P. Morgan, Global Mergers and
Acquisitions Review, at 89).
51. See Verret, supra note 49, at Part III.B.
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prohibitive costs to activism, hedge funds that specialize in activist
investing can develop economies of scale in the field. By doing this sort of
activity full time, they could find cost efficiencies. A hedge fund would be
able to use, for instance, ongoing relationships with a law firm that could
help negotiate down the price. A hedge fund might even have inside
counsel devoted only to activism, which a larger institution could not
afford as it operates in an environment that encourages competition on
operational expenses. The lack of fee competition in the hedge fund
industry would allow them to absorb more costs in this area.
Developing an internal corporate governance rating capability in
identifying problem firms can also be useful for the non-activist trading on
the side. This would not be the case for a more passive investor. In other
words, the information garnered through the corporate governance rating
function could also be useful to non-activist trading by the firm or could
just be sold to another hedge fund that would be able to use it. An
exception would be where the fund has representatives on a firm's board,
which will mean the fund cannot trade on information of that individual
firm because it would make the fund liable for insider trading.
Hedge funds may also serve as a leader for activism that mutual funds
can follow. The exemption from investment company registration means
that hedge funds are not subject to the same securities law constraints as
other institutional investors. Further, as a single actor, they are not
constrained by the requirement that they file communication disclosures.52
Also, hedge funds are free to engage in activism without violating the
Regulation M tax rules that require over-diversification in mutual fund
portfolios. 3
Hedge funds will also benefit from the ability to use the "220," a new
and cheap method for getting information to embarrass directors and
officers and convince them to relinquish control.54 Requests by hedge
funds to inspect corporations' books and records are already common in
Delaware.55 Some hedge funds make use of activist strategies to institute
52. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78m(d) and 78n(a) (2000).
53. If a mutual fund holds greater than a ten percent stake in any one of the companies
in its portfolio, then it forfeits its diversified status and, therefore, loses its preferential tax
treatment. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (1988). Subchapter
M of the Internal Revenue Code levies substantial tax penalties on mutual funds which are
not diversified. I.R.C. § 85 1(b)(4) (1988).
54. For more on section 220 litigation generally, see Radin, supra note 46 (arguing that
Section 220 has ushered in a new stage of litigation and activism by granting shareholders a
right to inspect corporate books and records).
55. See, e.g., Polygon Global Opportunities Master Fund v. West Corp., No. Civ.A.
2313-N, 2006 WL 2947486, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2006); Shamrock Activist Value Fund,
L.P. v. iPass Inc., C.A. No. 2462-N, 2006 WL 3824882, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2006);
Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P. v. Motient Corp., 906 A.2d 156, 157 (Del. Ch. 2006).
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"220" records inspections against the companies in which they invest, or
they may make use of shareholder rights through appraisals and injunctions
against mergers to negotiate for share repurchase or seats on a corporate
board . Sure, board minutes, for instance, are often benign; however, the
Disney57 case demonstrates how board minutes can include discussions that
a board never believed would become an issue, yet ultimately do. Hedge
funds also have the ability to bring a nuisance suit to stop a takeover, and
the ability to use information garnered in their merger/governance analysis
function to trade in merger arbitrage operations, or to sell that information
to other hedge funds.
Other institutions will sometimes free ride on activism-especially if
they are themselves investors in the activist hedge fund. The problem
previously was that there was no one with a profitable reason to lead the
charge. In other words, hedge funds benefit even if they lose the first
couple of fights, where other institutions with more passive investors did
not have an incentive to participate unless everyone else did. This is a
prisoner's dilemma where everyone ended up in a worse position than if
they all had participated.
Also consider the implications of having more captive money, which
allows hedge funds to take more illiquid positions. 8 There is another effect
flowing from lockups that permit activism as well-activist hedge funds
will have more time to develop their earnings record. Much of the
investment is on faith for a newly formed fund; if it loses the first few
fights then its investors cannot get out and will have to stay the length of
the lockup. Big firms, knowing that, will understand that the activists are
less rational and more willing to fight, even if the expected value of the
outcome is negative. Negotiation is partly about who has the most to lose
especially where there is open information about the relative positions of
the parties. Therefore, hedge funds are aided in negotiations with firms
because they can afford to lose the first couple of fights and still come out
ahead.
Additionally, once a hedge fund has developed a reputation for
aggressive activism, it can obtain advantages with less expensive threats.
Once it has a few victories under its belt, merely taking a one or two
percent stake in a company could be an effective signal that the fund is
willing to fight, and some firms might back down. The case of Cadbury is
instructive. Nelson Peltz purchased three percent of its outstanding shares
and advocated for a breakup of the company's beverages and candy
divisions to make the company a more attractive target for a private equity
56. For more on this, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 6.
57. Disney v. Walt Disney Co., 857 A.2d 444, (Del. Ch. 2004).
58. See Two-Year Lock-Up for Hedge Funds Seen as Promoting Activist Strategies,
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 569 (Apr. 3, 2006).
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buyout.59 Coming on the heels of his successful proxy fights with Heinz
and Wendy's, 60 Peltz's reputation as an activist was sound. 61 Further, his
ability to convince other investors to go along was also sound, as his track
record was good for maximization of shareholder value at the other
companies he had targeted. Thus, the odds of a victory, if he committed his
full resources, were measurably threatening. His willingness to dedicate
resources to purchasing three percent of the shares was an effective signal
of his willingness to dedicate considerably more to waging a full proxy
fight. But he didn't need to. Cadbury quickly got the message and
acquiesced.62 The share price immediately responded positively to the
company's announcement that it would split the divisions. 63  This cost-
effective activism requires specialization, something institutional investors
are constrained from achieving, but which they can take advantage of
through investments in these types of funds.
III. CHALLENGES POSED BY THE NEW MARKET STRUCTURE AND
REGULATION OF INSTITUTIONS INVESTING IN HEDGE FUNDS
A. Regulatory Environment for Institutions Investing in Hedge Funds
When hedge funds were first created, only wealthy individuals and
families could invest in them. Yet now, banks and pensions are
increasingly becoming involved.64  Banks present the most difficult
problem, and will therefore form the bulk of this Article's policy
prescriptions. This is due to the recent Graham-Leach-Bliley reforms; the
opportunities for conflict are omnipresent for banks because of the wide
variety of business in which they can now engage in the wake of the de-
59. Nelson Peltz prepping for Cadbury Schweppes buyout?,
http://www.bloggingbuyouts.com/2007/03/15/cadbury-gets-peltz/ (Mar. 15, 2007, 4:37
PM).
60. See Press Release, Heinz, Heinz Announces Preliminary Proxy Voting Results;
Looks Forward with Confidence to Executing Its Plans to Increase Shareholder Value (Sept.
8, 2006) available at http://www.heinz.com/News f.aspx; Verret, supra note 49 at 33,
(summarizing the Peltz proxy fight against Heinz). See also Lisa Gewirtz, Heinz:
Anticipation Still Buzzword, THE DEAL, Aug. 17, 2006, available at
http://www.thedeal.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=TheDeal/TDDArticle/TDStandar
dArticle&bn=NULL&c=TDDArticle&cid=l155049708430 (discussing Peltz's Heinz and
Wendy's proxy victories).
61. See Verret, supra note 49, at n.199 (discussing Peltz's prolificity).
62. Nelson Peltz prepping for Cadbury Schweppes buyout?, supra note 59.
63. Posting of Paul Murphy to FT Alphaville,
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/03/15/3186/cadbury-splits/ (March 15, 2007, 7:33
GMT).
64. See Paul U. Ali, Hedge Fund Investments and the Prudent Investor Rule, 17 TR. L.
INT'L. 74, 74-75 (2003).
2007]
76 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:1
regulation.65 It is important to recognize that there are conflicts for pension
fund investors as well; however, ERISA, with the federal Department of
Labor administrative guidance, should form a sufficient framework to
police the conflicts that will face private pensions.
Banks typically act as fiduciaries for a number of account classes for
which they are trustees. In 2002, trustees in the United States controlled
over 1.1 trillion dollars in trust accounts, with a portion of that total run by
chartered banks.66 As such, they have discretion over which asset classes
these accounts will be invested in. Different institutions regulate banks
depending on the source of its charter and its ownership structure. They
may be chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
or by the Federal Reserve, or they may be state chartered and regulated by
the FDIC. States typically allow non-banks to act as trustees for funds.67
In addition, if they are owned by a financial holding company, the Federal
Reserve will pre-empt other federal regulators.
Every state has a body of fiduciary duty and trust law that will apply
to these activities. Whether the bank in question is a federally chartered
bank or not, it will still be subject to state law. This is because OCC
regulations proscribe that national banks chartered by the Comptroller of
the Currency will be permitted to invest common trust assets in mutual
funds and other equity classes, provided that such investment is permitted
for state banks organized under the laws of the state in which the national
bank maintains its headquarters.6 8
Trustee powers are first construed based on the documents controlling
the contract relationship,6 9 with an eye toward upholding freedom of
contract so long as the "prudent" investor rule is met.7 ° Though there is a
common law rule against delegation of trustee responsibilities, that
delegation does not include investment in investment companies. This is
justified under the assumption that the trustee has control over whether to
invest in the investment company and whether to liquidate such investment
when appropriate. 7' Though it was originally illegal for trustees to pay a
65. See generally Samuel L. Hayes III, The Impact of Recombining Commercial and
Investment Banking, 70 BROOK. LAW REV. 39, 49-50 (2004) (examining the current
regulatory scheme and problems confronting it).
66. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIEs 753 (2d ed. 2004).
67. Id. at 753.
68. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Trust Banking Circular 4 Banking
Issuance (Sept. 29, 1976).
69. See Ali, supra note 64, at 80.
70. Matter of Onbank & Trust Co., 649 N.Y.S.2d 592, 596 (App. Div. 1996).
71. Id.
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management fee to investment companies out of trustee assets, state laws
have since been amended to allow the practice.72
Though supplemented by statute and narrowed by contractual
limitations, fiduciary duty common laws are the overriding principle
around which a fiduciary's activities are judged. They require that
investment of trust money be done in accordance with the prudent interest
of the trust beneficiaries, with that prudent interest being defined by
statutory constructs and case law.73 The seminal state case in this area is
Harvard College v. Amory:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall
conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is
to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence
manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in
regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
the probably outcome, as well as the probably safety of the
capital to be invested.
74
Self-dealing, or investing trust assets in a way that benefits the trustee
to the detriment of the trust beneficiary, is one recognized violation of the
prudent investor rule. For instance: investing trust money in a publicly
traded stock where the trustee also has a large holding in the stock-when
there is some evidence that the stock is overpriced and the investment is
large enough to have a detrimental effect on prudent diversification of the
trust portfolio-is a clear case of fiduciary duty violation.75 Though not
binding precedent, the Third Restatement of Trusts is an informative source
of law used by both state legislators and judges in interpreting trust duties.
It was amended in 1994 to address the issue of fiduciaries investing in other
entities, and its approach essentially embraces modem portfolio theory.76
72. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 66, at 769.
73. This was also noted in an agreement between the President's Working Group on
Financial Markets and United States agency principals. See Press Release, Agreement
Among PWG and U.S. Agency Principles and Guidelines Regarding Private Pools of
Capital (2007), http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/hp272-principles.pdf, at 2-3
(hereinafter "President's Working Group") ("Concerns that less sophisticated investors are
exposed indirectly to private pools through holdings of pension funds, fund-of-funds, or
other similar pooled investment vehicles can best be addressed through sound practices on
the part of the fiduciaries that manage such vehicles. These fiduciaries have a duty under
applicable law to act in the best interest of the beneficiaries. They have an ongoing
responsibility to perform due diligence to ensure that their investment decisions are prudent
and conform to sound practices for fiduciaries. Such pooled investment vehicles should
address any special issues relating to investment in private pools of capital, including the
availability of relevant, accurate, and timely historical and ongoing material information").
74. Harvard Coll. & Mass. Gen. Hosp. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446,461 (Mass. 1830).
75. Cent. Nat'l Bank of Mattoon v. U.S. Dep't. of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897 (7th Cir.
1990).
76. Uniform Prudent Investor Act, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
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Pensions are another pooled investment entity that places money in
hedge funds." They are similar to trusts in that they utilize a trust manager
who has broad discretion in placing pooled assets. Under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), fiduciaries of employee
retirement plans are regulated to protect pension holders from abuse; the
fiduciary law of trusts was invoked by Congress within the ERISA
framework to define the general scope of authority and responsibility for
pension officers.7" ERISA guidelines supplement the general fiduciary
duty law of trusts and further define the law of private pensions as
including the duties of prudence and loyalty. 9 As a general matter, there is
nothing wrong with fiduciaries, pension or otherwise, investing in a hedge
fund if the investment comports with the prudent investor rule. ° To meet
these duties, an ERISA plan fiduciary must, at the time of the transaction:
utilize proper methods to investigate, evaluate, and structure the
investment; act in a manner as would others familiar with such matters; and
exercise independent judgment when making investment decisions.8' As
with most trusts, when the governing contract restricts an ERISA plan
officer's investment discretion further than ERISA guidelines, such
restriction will govern. To increase the web of complexity in this area,
ERISA plan administrators will frequently place the assets of the plan with
a bank to serve as a trustee for the ERISA plan beneficiaries. In those
cases, fiduciary obligations will apply to the trustee through both common
law and common law as adopted by federal statute.
The Comptroller of the Currency has discretion to issue a notice of
intent to revoke a bank's authority to provide trust services; and can do so
upon providing a hearing before an OCC administrative law judge, if it has
evidence that the bank has exercised its trust powers "unlawfully or
State Laws, 1994. "(1) The standard of prudence is applied to any investment as part of the
total portfolio, rather than to individual investments. In the trust setting the term 'portfolio'
embraces all the trust's assets. UPIA § 2(b). (2) The tradeoff in all investing between risk
and return is identified as the fiduciary's central consideration. UPIA § 2(b). (3) All
categoric restrictions on types of investments have been abrogated; the trustee can invest in
anything that plays an appropriate role in achieving the risk/return objectives of the trust and
that meets the other requirements of prudent investing. UPIA § 2(e). (4) The long familiar
requirement that fiduciaries diversify their investments has been integrated into the
definition of prudent investing. UPIA § 3. (5) The much criticized former rule of trust law
forbidding the trustee to delegate investment and management functions has been reversed.
Delegation is now permitted, subject to safeguards. UPIA § 9." Id. at Objective of the Act.
77. See Ali, supra note 64, at 89.
78. Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc., 173 F.3d 313,
317 (5th Cir 1999).
79. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000).
80. See Ali, supra note 64, at 86.
81. Id. at 87.
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unsoundly., 81 Currently, the OCC provides some guidance on fiduciary
standards in the form of circulars issued under authority granted in 12 CFR
§ 9.83 State regulators and private litigants further supplement the
enforcement of fiduciary standards. 4
The Federal Reserve has broad discretion as a regulator. It can define
unsafe banking practices that are harmful to deposit holders and require
banks to cease such activities. To provide guidance to banks in making
decisions, the Federal Reserve issues advisory letters that help banks
predict how the Federal Reserve will react to particular activities and
provide guidance on the standard of review it will use in evaluating those
activities. Although the Federal Reserve issued supervisory guidance letter
SR 99-78' to help banks navigate the web of fiduciary conflicts that may
arise when placing trust assets in mutual funds, it has issued no such letter
regarding placement of trust assets within hedge funds. 6 Though its
prescriptions may be helpful by analogy, more guidance is needed due to
the particular nature of hedge fund fees and their attendant conflict risks.
82. 12 U.S.C. § 92a(k) (2000).
83. Marvin A. Freeland, National Banks as Service Providers to Employee Benefit
Plans, 113 BANKING L.J. 994, 995 (1996).
84. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 68.
85. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation, Supervisory Letter SR 99-7 (SPE): Supervisory Guidance
Regarding the Investment of Fiduciary Assets in Mutual Funds and Potential Conflicts of
Interest (March 26, 1999), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLetters/ 999/SR9907.HTM.
86. See Bank Lending To and Other Transactions with Hedge Funds: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin.
Servs., 106th Cong. 106, 121 (1999) (statement of Laurence H. Meyer, Member, Bd. Of
Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys.) (explaining that supervisory opinion letters are intended to
"enhance and support market discipline by strengthening the risk management processes of
major creditors and counterparties").
87. SR 99-7 requires the following:
Reasoned Legal Opinion - The institution should obtain a reasoned opinion of
counsel that addresses the conflict of interest inherent in the receipt of fees or
other forms of compensation from mutual fund providers in connection with the
investment of fiduciary assets. The opinion should address the permissibility of
the investment and compensation under applicable state or federal laws, trust
instrument, or court order, as well as any applicable disclosure requirements or
"reasonableness" standard for fees set forth in the law.
Establishment of Policies and Procedures - The institution should establish
written policies and procedures governing the acceptance of fees or other
compensation from mutual fund providers as well as the use of proprietary
mutual funds. The policies must be reviewed and approved by the institution's
board of directors or its designated committee. Policies and procedures should,
at a minimum, address the following issues: (1) designation of decision-making
authority; (2) analysis and documentation of investment decisions; (3)
compliance with applicable laws, regulations and sound fiduciary principles,
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Hedge funds that meet the high net worth test for their investors are
still largely unregulated. The fact that their activities are highly secretive,
combined with the presence of some large hedge funds at the center of late
trading mutual fund scandals, is cause for much concern among federal
regulators and all investors in these funds.88 The Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) has tried to address some of the issues facing regulators
of hedge fund investors, such as requiring registration, which would have
given the SEC insight into the trading activities of these funds through
compliance audits. Further, anyone who engages in securities trading is
subject to the general anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1934.
Proper coordination between the SEC and other regulators will determine
whether a future SEC regulatory regime for hedge funds helps to cure some
of the problems faced by institutions that invest in hedge funds. In
addition, many hedge fund advisers are still voluntarily registered as
advisers, so the Goldstein89 decision will not affect the SEC's intelligence
capability in that regard.
B. Problems Facing Institutions Investing in Hedge Funds
The ethical dilemma faced by banks engaged in trust activities is that
they may have a vested financial interest contrary to the interest of their
trust beneficiary. 90 A hedge fund may provide a trustee with a fee rebate in
return for investing in the fund. Hedge funds typically borrow more than
what they invest. For example, if investing ten million dollars, a hedge
including any disclosure requirements or "reasonableness" standards for fees;
and (4) staff training and methods for monitoring compliance with policies and
procedures by internal or external audit staff.
Analysis and Documentation of Investment Decisions - Where fees or other
compensation are received in connection with fiduciary account investments
over which the institution has investment discretion or where such investments
are made in the institution's proprietary mutual funds, the institution should
fully document its analysis supporting the investment decision. This analysis
should be performed on a regular, ongoing basis and would typically include
factors such as historical performance comparisons to similar mutual funds,
management fees and expense ratios, and ratings by recognized mutual fund
rating services. The institution should also document its assessment that the
investment is, and continues to be, appropriate for the individual account, in the
best interest of account beneficiaries, and in compliance with the provisions of
the Prudent Investor or Prudent Man Rules, as appropriate.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, supra note 85.
88. See Ron Orol & Donna Block, SEC Chair Scolds Hedge Fund Lawyers, THE DEAL,
Mar. 7, 2005, available at
http://www.thedeal.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename TheDeal/TDDArticle/TDStandar
dArticle&bn=NULL&c=TDDArticle&cid=l 107993118187.
89. Goldstein v. SEC 451 F.3d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
90. See generally Ali, supra note 64.
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fund may well borrow an additional fifty or sixty million dollars to invest.
So what if in exchange for placing a bank's trust assets in the hedge fund,
the hedge fund takes out loans from the same bank? The risk is that the
trustee will not make decisions on where to place trust assets based on the
proper risk/return provided by the asset, but rather by the hope for interest
fees from the hedge fund as a quid pro quo.
If the trust documents describe the kinds of fees that a trustee will
accept from a hedge fund, is that enough to cure the dilemma, or must the
trustees further disclose particular arrangements with hedge funds?
Alternatively, is it a better idea to ban the practice altogether and prevent
possible trouble?9' Should regulators require that trust divisions submit to
random compliance audits or would audits by independent accounting
firms be enough?
The bank that acts as trustee may also run its own hedge fund.92 In
that case, it will have a clear vested interest in placing trust assets with its
fund because of the high performance fee. A common device used to cure
institutional conflicts is to build operation walls around potential conflicts,
requiring that trust officers and hedge fund managers be supervised and
compensated by different parts of the institution. Is this enough to cure the
conflict? Could an employee still have a vested interest in the general
economic well-being of the institutional employer despite the operational
wall?
C. Political Challenges
The U.S. banking system is subject to both horizontal and vertical
regulatory competition, and banking regulators have a vested interest in the
outcome of these regulations. If the OCC and the FDIC take positions
different from the Federal Reserve, or state regulators take fundamentally
different positions, it may mean banks that wish to invest in hedge funds
will prefer the lighter regulator.
Other institutions that regulate hedge funds may also conflict with the
Federal Reserve. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
and the SEC issue rules that define the activities that investors in hedge
funds can engage in. If the Federal Reserve issues rules in its capacity as a
regulator of fiduciaries that incentivize investors in hedge funds in ways
that is adverse to the goals of the SEC and the CFTC, then the potential for
further political turf wars, as well as Congressional involvement, increases.
91. See Ali, supra note 64, at 86.
92. This is overly simplistic, as the "bank" will consist of numerous holding companies,
such as fiduciary operations at Goldman Sachs Asset Management and hedge fund trading
at Goldman Sachs Capital Partners, but with ultimately one umbrella organization in
control.
2007]
82 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:1
Public pension funds present a unique political and administrative
challenge in this area as well. 93 Public pensions are governed by public
bodies consisting of elected officials and individuals appointed by elected
officials. Although this makes public pensions uniquely accountable to the
electorate, it many times invokes severe conflicts of interest. For example,
investment groups could give to the campaigns of elected officials, or pay
lobbying fees to former members of pension oversight bodies, in order to
garner investments and reap the management and carry fees from them.
These conflicts are furthered by the fact that public pensions are not
regulated by the federal government, unlike private pensions that are
regulated under ERISA. As this area will require a state-level political
solution, rather than a federal policy-oriented solution, I will leave that
challenge open to future exploration.
In addition, the banking and financial services lobbies will be
particularly interested in the outcome of these rules and may seek to
overturn Federal Reserve pronouncements with Congressional lawmaking.
If they can convince Congress to pass a statute granting a safe harbor for
certain activities, for instance, then they might preempt the Federal
Reserve's regulation. Another group with a vested interest will be mutual
funds, which compete with hedge funds for fiduciary money, and trust
beneficiaries themselves.
Another political challenge facing regulators in this area are the state
Attorney Generals that may want to override federal regulation to catch
some of the glamour that comes along with prosecuting a large financial
institution on behalf of voters. While this may reap political capital, it
wreaks havoc with private markets and federal regulators. Attorney
Generals may be unwilling to coordinate with other regulatory bodies, thus
leaving banks without any ability to plan their activities to maintain
compliance. Also, state Attorney Generals may lack the sophisticated
financial expertise to properly regulate financial markets, relying instead on
broad fraud statutes and showy trials before unsophisticated juries.
D. Is Increased Regulation the Answer?
It seems that there is a marked difference between willingness, on the
part of regulators, to allow investors to undertake some risks, such as
systematic risk and interest rate risk, while at the same time expending
significant government resources and requiring expenditure of investment
company resources to minimize operational risk such as risk of fraud.
What is the reason for the difference? 94 Is it that operational risk is easier
93. See President's Working Group, supra note 73, at 2.
94. For some unique ideas to explain the difference, see Stephen J. Choi & A.C.
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing the
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to quantify, measure, or prevent? 95 If interest rate risk was something
political actors legitimately felt they could shield investors from, then
would they set up a state-run organization to help assess and minimize
exposure to interest rate risk?
One question that becomes readily apparent is whether it is a good
idea to set up multiple avenues for the same preventative effect. For
instance, many of the abuses in hedge fund trading scandals and fiduciary
duty violations cases are already textbook fraud, vulnerable to prosecution
by the Department of Justice and civil action by the OCC or private
litigants. Is it that these punitive responses are not enough to properly
prevent abuse? And if so, would bolstering enforcement of these existing
avenues of regulatory oversight be a less costly way to achieve the same
result?
Investing in hedge funds is a relatively new phenomenon for banks.
To the extent that fiduciary duty violations are unique when these entities
invest in hedge funds rather than other investment vehicles, banking
regulators should provide guidance in the form of administrative opinions.
As bank compliance officers face unique challenges in response to trust
office inquiries, they will seek guidance from the banking regulators. But
guidance should come at the inquiry of the trust industry to address issues
they face individually, not the other way around. Banks should be
interested in enhancing information flow requirements to enhance public
perception of the trust industry.
Many of the ethical conflicts facing actors in the hedge fund industry
can be addressed using tools presently available in the regulatory
environment. For instance, if a less onerous hedge fund registration
requirement were to be instituted in the future, it would be advisable that
the SEC provide banking regulators with the power to establish formal
information sharing by fund investors. If registering entities used their
compliance powers with registered hedge funds to collect information on
trust officers that invested with those funds, banking regulators could cross
reference that information with their own compliance audits to look for
abuse of fiduciary status. In addition, if the information were made
available to private litigants and other enforcement agencies upon issuance
of a subpoena, then other enforcement mechanisms already in place would
be enhanced. Rather than incur the increased cost of creating new
enforcement initiatives, it would be advisable to utilize current avenues
more effectively if doing so can achieve the same desired result.
idea that various behavioral biases influence regulators, particularly the SEC).
95. Another take on this phenomenon posits that regulators merely regulate whether it
is necessary or not, as it serves their own interests. See Milton Friedman, Why Government
is the Problem, in 39 ESSAYS ON PUBLIC POLICY, 7-12 (1993).
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Furthermore, global banking.institutions will face unique challenges if
the Federal Reserve's rules are fundamentally different from those of
financial regulators in other countries. For example, if the United
Kingdom's Financial Services Authority (FSA) or the Bank of Japan (BOJ)
were to take dramatically different positions, then the complexity facing
global institutions like Citigroup may be prohibitive. One difficulty
Citigroup--a bank with a United States charter-might face is what it
should do with funds it holds as a fiduciary for a sophisticated and wealthy
investor who is a citizen of a country in the European Union, but invests in
its London branch. The difficulty arises where the best available
investments are hedge funds located in the United States and abroad that
invest around the world. In short, a lack of global harmony in banking
fiduciary regulations could potentially run counter to investor protection
objectives. If the approach used by the Federal Reserve and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency incorporates self-regulatory organizations
(SROs) and enhanced regulatory regimes, then while federal rules will not
engage in cross border conflicts, SROs will already be attuned to cross




The ERISA rules should be amended so that hedge funds where public
pensions hold 25% of the equity will not be subjected to ERISA
regulations.96 A more nuanced guideline-such as an exemption for hedge
funds that accept money from institutions already regulated by ERISA,
combined with more regulatory guidance for institutions that invest in
hedge funds-would allow pensions to utilize the advantages hedge funds
offer while still monitoring conflicts. After all, there is nothing magical
that happens at 25% holdings that does not occur at 10%. The evolution of
this market structure calls for a second look at ERISA guidelines designed
to serve an outdated dynamic.
2. Recommendation #2
In the event that some new form of registration becomes required, the
information gathered during compliance audits could be used by both
private and governmental actors for oversight of institutions that invest in
hedge funds. Therefore, information gleaned during these audits should be
96. This would amend 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(f) (1974).
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made available to those authorities and individuals to enhance their ability
to prevent mismanagement and fraud. In addition, if a proposal for
regulation of a hedge fund is accepted, that fund should have access to the
same information.
Accordingly, financial regulators should establish a "Financial
Regulatory Coordination Board" with a full staff and a board comprised of
banking and securities regulators, as well as private SROs.97 This board
would establish guidelines for releasing the results of compliance audits to
each other in addition to private investors. Such guidelines would set a
standard requiring that information be sent to private actors when a case or
controversy is established in some forum of dispute or when the agencies
have a reasonable belief that the interests of investors are materially
threatened. Understandably, the standard would need to be lower for
information sent to coordinating agencies and self-regulating organizations.
Further, guidelines would be issued by the board to ensure that the
proprietary character of trading operations is protected and that firms do
not lose money from their trading operations once their information is
revealed on the exchange markets.
3. Recommendation #3
The Federal Reserve and the Comptroller of the Currency should
issue supervisory releases and circulars encouraging regulated fiduciaries
who invest in hedge funds to disclose to all fiduciaries the precise nature
and amount of fee relationships that the bank has with the fund. The
release would not mandate disclosure but merely describe it as a safe
harbor that would permit the fiduciary to rely on disclosure as one practice
that will presumptively protect it from liability for breach of fiduciary duty.
For the disclosure to provide protection, it should require that the bank
reveal any other relationships in which the bank, or any affiliate thereof,
and the fiduciary, or any affiliate thereof, has with the hedge fund or any of
its affiliates. The Federal Reserve and the Comptroller of the Currency, in
the same administrative releases, should include an encouragement that the
banks get proxy approval from fiduciaries for the fees charged with
withdrawal of funds as a permitted alternative to approval.98
97. Recommendations of this sort have been made previously. See President's Working
Group, supra note 73, at 6 ("Supervisors should take full advantage of both formal and
informal channels of coordination and cooperation across financial industry sectors and
international borders when carrying out their responsibilities related to internationally active
financial institutions' management of exposures to private pools and leveraged
counterparties."). Though the report is a good start, the organization's recommendations are
not enough.
98. This recommendation is also in line with the recent President's Working Group
principles. See id. at 5 ("Supervisors should clearly communicate their expectations
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4. Recommendation #4
The banking regulators should encourage existing banking
associations to promulgate the best practices in trust creation relating to
fee compensation, with model trust documents that best protect the trust
beneficiary from fee exploitation. Compliance with such a document
would be another factor that the Federal Reserve and the OCC would
include as being among the presumptive best practices that afford safe
harbor protection in their administrative releases. 99
regarding prudent management of counterparty credit exposures, including those to private
pools of capital and other leveraged counterparties, who are increasingly utilizing complex
instruments, including certain over-the-counter derivatives and structured securities, such as
collateralized debt obligations." Supervisors' expectations with respect to prudent risk
management practices should take into account developments in financial markets and
advances in best practices for counterparty credit risk management. Supervisors should
actively monitor such developments and revise their policies and associated guidance as
appropriate in a timely manner. In turn, supervisors should actively monitor and assess
whether policies and procedures measure up to regulatory guidance and industry efforts to
identify best practices.").
99. Ali, supra note 64, at 87-88, provides a fiduciary investor's best practices guide that
might serve as a useful start:
(a) Understand the legal structure of the hedge fund; (b) Understand the hedge
fund's investment strategy, including the risks inherent in that strategy, whether
there are any limits on the ability of the hedge fund manager to take
concentrated positions..., the degree to which leverage is used by the hedge fund
manager to implement that strategy, and the scalability of the hedge fund's
investment strategy; (c) Understand the market or "systematic" risk of the bond,
share and derivatives markets in which the hedge fund invests; (d) Understand
the composition of the hedge fund's portfolio, the "unsystematic" or unique
risks, in particular the credit risk or risk of default and insolvency, associated
with the individual instruments in which the hedge fund has invested, and the
price volatility (that is, the extent to which the price of an instrument fluctuates)
and the liquidity (that is, the ability to buy or sell instruments expeditiously at a
reasonable price) of those instruments; (e) Understand the liquidity of the hedge
fund....This is dependent upon the hedge fund's lock-up and redemption
policies, the liquidity of the instruments invested in by the hedge fund and
whether there is a secondary market for interests in the hedge fund (hedge funds
are not usually listed on an official exchange such as the London Stock
Exchange); (f) Monitor the returns generated by the hedge fund, in particular
declines (or "draw downs", as they are euphemistically referred to) in the net
asset value of the hedge fund and the extent to which the fiduciary's own
portfolio is exposed to the hedge fund; (g) Monitor changes to the composition
of the hedge fund's portfolio....(h) Monitor redemptions of hedge fund
interests...; and (i) Where possible, demand more detailed and regular disclosure
about the matters listed in items (f) to (h). (citations omitted).
ECONOMICS MAKES STRANGE BEDFELLOWS
5. Recommendation #5
The ERISA rules should be amended to include specific rules
alleviating potential conflicts between private pension managers and hedge
fund advisers. For instance, it should not be permissible for a financial
services company to invest its pension with a hedge fund that has lending
arrangements with the company, engages the company for prime
brokerage, or otherwise has a financial arrangement with the company
other than the pension investment.
6. Recommendation #6
The Federal Reserve and the OCC should encourage Congress to
establish a federal preemption in regulation of fiduciaries.'00 Any action
taken in compliance with the Federal Reserve or the OCC guidelines for
fiduciaries should be considered as presumptively fulfilling state fiduciary
duty requirements. This will prevent state and federal authorities from
pursuing inconsistent goals.'0 ' Though regulatory competition can be
particularly useful, as explored in the first section of this paper, it is
unlikely that state banking regulators can achieve the kind of sophistication
and expertise necessary to police the industry in the current environment. 1
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Therefore, though horizontal-regulatory competition between the OCC and
the Federal Reserve may be useful for the reasons explored in previous
sections, it is not advisable on the vertical level.
IV. CONCLUSION
The danger faced in the hedge funds field is that, caught up in
regulatory zeal, banking and pension regulators will limit access for
institutional investors, such as trusts and pension funds, to this useful asset
class. Additionally, the growing presence of hedge funds in political
lobbying, calls for a measured and final rule on this issue before Congress
becomes subject to regulatory capture.1
0 3
100. Indeed, it is difficult for financial regulators to achieve the international
coordination recommended in the President's Working Group's "Statement of Principles" if
they must contend with fifty additional sets of patchwork fiduciary duty principles. See
President's Working Group, supra note 73, at 6.
101. For example, similar goals were accomplished with federal preemption of state blue
sky laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1988).
102. For one recent and useful step in the direction of OCC regulation, see Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
103. The Managed Funds Association (MFA) intends to double the size of its political
action committee in 2007 to further its lobbying efforts. See Carrie Johnson & Jeffrey H.
Birnbaum, Hedge Funds Begin to Show Up on Regulators' Radar, WASH. POST, Feb. 9,
2007]
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Oversight of trust officers and fiduciaries in the banking sector has
occupied banking regulators since before the founding of this country.
Though hedge funds are a relatively new phenomenon, the Federal Reserve
and other banking regulators should be able to mend the fiduciary
regulatory regime to account for the unique challenges of hedge fund
investing by properly accounting for economic and political considerations
for rulemaking in both the domestic and international spheres. In
particular, proper integration with international banking regulators and
securities regulators is essential and should be tempered by balancing the
interests of the various constituencies involved.
Further, a more nuanced view of ERISA guidelines will permit
policing conflicts without overly constraining the dis-intermediation of
capital in the United States. The market wants to evolve, and its natural
processes are leading it to limit information asymmetries and agency
conflicts that constrain its efficiency. With a careful, intelligent regulatory
touch, it is possible that the operational risk represented by the agency
conflict of the separation of ownership and capital can be significantly
reduced by the growing institutional interest in activist hedge funds,
thereby flouting conventional wisdom in the story of market development.
2007, at DO1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/08/AR2007020801829.html (discussing the growing efforts by
Congress and various federal agencies to gauge whether there is a need for new hedge fund
regulation, and the role lobbying will play in influencing governmental policies in this area).
